Friday, July 29, 2011

Bullpen History 101

     In the sixth inning of Tuesday's game against the Cubs, Chris Narveson was in a jam. The lefty had pitched well save for a 2-run first, but was now on the verge of a big inning, with the the bases loaded with Cubs, no outs, and a tenuous 3-2 lead. Thanks to a recent off-day, manager Ron Roenicke had a bullpen full of rested relievers, and several right-handed hitters up next. Roenicke ambled out to the mound, and called
for right-hander Kameron Loe. What was probably the right decision on a tactical level paid off big. Loe coaxed a fielder's choice (out at home) and double play from Alfonso Soriano and Darwin Barney, averting a potential disaster and ending his night with a WPA of .353.
    It took a long time, but Kameron Loe is finally being utilized in his ideal-world role. The fact that Loe was in the game is a credit to the pitchers ahead of him, Doug Melvin, and (hopefully) an enlightened approach to bullpen management on the part of Ron Roenicke. While Tuesday was just one game and Loe was one of five Brewer pitchers used that night, the move at least gives us hope that Roenicke has figured his bullpen out.
     However, this bullpen and the man calling the shots are a result of many different events, taking place over eight years, three managers, and countless pitchers. And before we profile the current state of affairs, it's necessary to touch on what got us here. All of this started in 2003, when Ned Yost was hired as manager of the Brewers after A's bench coach Ken Macha turned down the job. Coming off a 56-106 season led by Davey Lopes and Jerry Royster, Yost wasn't expected to bring the team into contention immediately or even soon. He was merely counted on to mentor the upcoming wave of young talent that, if everything broke right, would converge for several playoff runs in the late 2000s. After multiple losing efforts where Yost's tactics and habits largely went unscrutinized, the young core Brewers brass envisioned had materialize. In 2008, the Brewers were finally in the race for a playoff spot, and his managerial mishaps, most painfully obvious in his use of relievers, became much more apparent. Yost tended to burn through his bullpen in the middle innings, only to be seriously handicapped trying to preserve late leads. Even more damning was the soon-to-be ex-manager's inexplicable need to pitch merely serviceable LOOGY Brian Shouse in nearly every game, even if it required facing multiple right-handed hitters, a fault which became glaringly obvious in his final game before being fired. (Just imagine what would have happened had CC Sabathia not thrown seven complete games in the season's last three months.)
     After 2008, GM Doug Melvin hired Macha, who had been hired and fired as A's manager during Yost's tenure. Macha's two years in Milwaukee were plauged by communication woes, a refusal to run despite several speedy players, and an inability to follow up on the playoff appearance Yost nearly blew, but he did run an excellent bullpen. During his time in Milwaukee, Macha was able to draw solid setup work from salvage jobs Todd Coffey and Kameron Loe, create an excellent closer from scratch, and get seasons of good work out of LOOGY Mitch Stetter and ROOGY Mark DeFelice. However, his alleged inability to reach young players got him axed last November, which brings us to where we are today.
     Macha's successor, Ron Roenicke, has drawn no complaints about his clubhouse, but has employed something of a mixed bag of tactics, from his creative shifts to "aggressive" baserunning to the Ryan Braun fifth-infielder thing. However, one area in which he has mostly played it by the book (not Joe Girardi's three-ring binder) is his bullpen. Roenicke started out the season without LaTroy Hawkins or Takashi Saito, which meant Zach Braddock appeared whenever an opposing manager dared write back-to-back lefties on lineup card, Kameron Loe pitched the eighth inning every day (giving many fans nightmares of Yost's strange fixation with Shouse), and John Axford was given free reign in save situations.
     While penciling guys into defined roles works with a pitching rotation, batting order, and defense, it isn't the ideal strategy for allocating relief innings. Luckily, as Saito and Hawkins returned and Braddock struggled getting a good night's sleep, the manager adapted, using the former two for seventh-inning duty and occasional setup work, but was unable to make up for the absence of the latter. When dealing with left-handed hitters near the end of a game, Roenicke had no choice but to let them tee off on his trio of righties (usually Loe).
     None of the early-season reinforcements are likely to prove as valuable as Francisco Rodriguez, however. The July trade gave the Brewers a non-closing reliever who could retire batters from both sides of the plate, giving Roenicke one less inning to worry about while bumping Kameron Loe into a role more commensurate with his skill set. Thanks to the presence of K-Rod, the manager could now pick his spots with Loe, dropping him in whenever a righty was up and the team needed a grounder (or two) as opposed to leaving him to get pounded by a power-hitting left hander because there were no better options.
     Rodriguez is likely to be the extent of the Brewers' bullpen acquisitions, so, barring another injury, trade, or surprise callup, we'll just cut to the happy ending. As fans of a team with a checkered past in the relief department, don't focus on the managerial malpractice, flameouts, and bad free-agent signings. Just enjoy the current arrangement while it's still working.

Look for part two of this series, a less retrospective analysis of the Brewers' bullpen, sometime next week.

Friday, July 22, 2011

Randy Wolf's Deal With the Devil

*I don't know where I got this idea, but I wrote this in about an hour. This is a poem based on "The Devil Went Down to Georgia" that suggests before/just after he signed with the Brewers, Randy Wolf made an illicit pact with Satan that allowed him to pitch better than his peripherals by stealing Zack Greinke's luck, only to have Greinke become his teammate a year later. I don't expect anyone everyone to like this, and am pretty sure this post will scare some people away from this blog. All I really care about is that I had fun writing it, and hope that mabye a couple people will find it funny. So, with interpretation when nessecary, here we go.

The Devil went to Indiana lookin' for a pitcher's soul to steal
'Twas Winter Meetings time, teams were waitin' in line to give guys free agent deals
When he saw a young man and his agent sittin' in the lobby, gettin' paid a lot
He jumped in front of the teams lined up and said, "Wolfie, let me tell you what..."

     In December 2009, the MLB Winter Meetings took place in Indianapolis, Indiana. At 33, Randy Wolf was still a fairly young man, which, along with his excellent 2009 season, made him a highly sought-after commodity. He and his agent Arn Tellem reportedly were reportedly being pursued by at least half-a dozen teams before signing a 3 year, 29.75 million dollar deal with the Milwaukee Brewers. At this point, he was certainly grateful and eager to prove his worth, so it's easy to see why Satan chose to approach him in this state.

"I guess you didn't know it, but for regression you are due
But if you don't care to play it fair, I can get some luck for you.
Now you've got a pretty good curveball, Randy, but you give up homers and walk a few
You'll pitch runs below your peripherals if you let me buy your soul from you."

Wolf said, "I know a man named Greinke, and I might be over my head.
Why don't you take his soul, he's just a Royal, but he's the best there's ever been."

     Wolf had an excellent 2009, utilizing his speed-limit curve to post a sparkling 3.23 ERA, but as a pitcher on the wrong side of 30 with a career ERA nearly a run higher, not to mention sporadic gopher-ball tendencies (when not pitching in roomy Dodger Stadium) and an occasionally high walk rate, he certainly looked like a candidate for regression. Knowing he was being counted on to anchor the number-two spot in the rotation, Wolf appreciated the extra help.
     However, he had grown somewhat attached to his soul, and didn't feel like giving it up. Happily, a suitable alternative, selling the luck of another pitcher, quickly entered his mind. He decided to propose to the devil that he screw over Zack Greinke, who would least be affected by the poor luck that would likely come with having one's soul taken. Greinke had just had a historic season, and even with a slight return to earth, would certainly still pitch well. In fact, taking some luck away from a young ace with four wipeout offerings and pinpoint command was only ensuring competitive balance, right? Even better, Greinke was signed to a two-year deal, and pitched for a team with no chance of making the postseason, so bad luck wouldn't affect Greinke's wallet or his club's fortunes. After realizing MLB had no laws about Satanic dealings, Wolf had cleared all the legal and moral hurdles in his mind, and took the deal.

(Chorus #1)
Zack, even if you walk no one and throw you fastball hard
Randy Wolf'll look better on the back of a baseball card
Satan don't care about your SIERA made of gold
You'll lose 'cause Randy chose to keep his soul

     If you are a believer in this theory (and just to be clear, I'm not), as long as the devil has Zack Greinke's soul, he will continue to get hit hard and give up runs, even if he strikes out ten guys and walks no one. Also, in accordance with the prophecy, Randy Wolf will continue to wriggle out of bases-loaded jams and have long flies die at the warning track as long as the devil makes good on his part of the deal.

And then Wolf signed with Milwaukee for 3 years in the show
Year one, more walks and homers, but his ERA was low.
2010, Zack pitched well again, but without the soul he dearly missed
Luck was not on Greinke's side; His line looked somethin' like this:

Next Winter, Doug Melvin thought Greinke could be his number-one
So he went and called up Dayton Moore and then the deal was done

     2010 went exactly according to plan. Randy Wolf baffled many observers, as he managed a 4.18 ERA despite preciptuous declines in all his peripherals. On the other hand, Greinke gave up a nearly identical rate of runs while faring better in almost every other department. However, Doug Melvin inadvertently ruined the plan by deciding Greinke would certainly return to form, acquiring the unfortunate pitcher in December. At this point, Randy knows his scheme backfired on him, as his team would now rely on Greinke's ability to prevent runs and (gasp!) a modest improvement in luck. A summer of sincerely cheering for Greinke, all while knowing he is doomed to the whims of Beezlebul, was not appealing to Wolf.

(Chorus #2)
The deal gets reported by Jim Breen
Zack Greinke's joining Randy's team
He misses bats, but the hits find holes
They hit, but don't score when Randy throws

Wolf walked toward Greinke's locker cause he wanted to come clean
He sighed, and went to tell him all about his scheme
And then Zack chuckled and said, "Randy, tell me that joke again.
You know those hits are cause of Yuni, he's the worst there's ever been."

(Chorus #2)
The deal gets reported by Jim Breen
Zack Greinke's joining Randy's team
He misses bats, but the hits find holes
They hit, but don't score when Randy throws


     After seeing countless well-executed Greinke pitches hit hard seemingly without reason, the guilt is too much for Randy Wolf, and he decides to explain to Greinke what is going on. After listening to Wolf confess to stealing his luck with the assistance of Satan, Zack Greinke breaks out laughing. He knew that his recent struggles were the product of the Brewers abysmal defense, namely shortstop Yuniesky Betancourt, but is nonetheless amused that Wolf would concoct such an outlandish story for entertainment. However, Betancourt overhears Greinke's remark, and is decidedly not entertained by Greinke's low opinion of him. Suddenly motivated, Betancourt begins diving for balls, reacting with cat-like quickness, and saving countless runs with his strong, accurate throws. Greinke, helped by the newfound defensive support, posts a 1.29 ERA in August and September, pitching the Brewers into the playoffs. Wolf's luck holds up, baffling the statistically-minded. Also baffling, well, the world, is Betancourt, who finishes 2010 with a +76 UZR, and, in a move lauded by the sabermetric community, is awarded a Gold Glove. The Brewers go on to win the World Series. Everyone except Satan lives happily ever after.

Wednesday, July 20, 2011

There's No Place Like Home

     Going into July 20, the Milwaukee Brewers are 52-46, half a game out of first place, and have done so despite an 14-20 start, a left side of the infield straight out of a horror movie, missed time from their catcher, right fielder, and number-one starter, and a home/road split that is just plain weird. In their 47 home games, the club has amassed to a  .702 winning percentage, a full 100 points better than the Yankees' 53-35. Outside of Milwaukee, the Crew has played to a .373 clip, "good" for a 60-win season straight out of Houston.
     From there, I started searching for answers about what could be behind this discrepancy. It's worth noting that this split is persisting in every facet of the game. The Brewers are showing a big home/road differential on offense (.279/.351/.466 at home, .234/.289/.369 on the road), on the mound (3.34 home FIP, 4.23 road FIP), in the field, and on the bases (80% stolen base success rate at home, and 69% away from the confines of Miller Park).
     That last paragraph doesn't accomplish a whole lot besides illustrate just how well the Brewers are playing at home and how poorly they perform on the road. So, we need to dig a little deeper, and nothing says "answers" like a big, homemade table of individual batting splits:

BB/K
ISO
BABIP
wOBA
Ryan Braun
0.85
0.67
0.303
0.191
0.355
0.317
0.467
0.379
Prince Fielder
1.31
0.88
0.348
0.197
0.309
0.292
0.465
0.369
Rickie Weeks
0.54
0.36
0.227
0.208
0.352
0.273
0.402
0.333
Corey Hart
0.48
0.42
0.256
0.171
0.333
0.273
0.397
0.307
Jonathon Lucroy
0.36
0.16
0.205
0.059
0.378
0.309
0.394
0.257
Mark Kotsay
1.11
0.38
0.082
0.082
0.32
0.236
0.335
0.24
Carlos Gomez
0.16
0.3
0.154
0.165
0.338
0.225
0.326
0.28
Nyjer Morgan
0.11
0.15
0.12
0.18
0.394
0.416
0.324
0.409
Yuni Betancourt
0.38
0.24
0.135
0.11
0.268
0.224
0.298
0.241
Casey McGehee
0.65
0.26
0.108
0.067
0.254
0.265
0.288
0.24
Craig Counsell
1.25
0.6
0.075
0
0.196
0.17
0.272
0.167

     A few thoughts: First off, home stats are directly below the listed metric and road stats are to the right of the home stats. For example, Prince Fielder has a .335 batting average at home and a .270 batting average on the road. Second, I am fully aware that the table, from an aesthetic standpoint, looks hideous, but I didn't want to take up five pages to give all 11 players their own Baseball-Reference chart.
     Now, some baseball-related notes: The numbers listed above are really strange, as every Brewer with over 50 PA (save for Nyjer Morgan) is performing significantly better at home than on the road. I was expecting some consistency from player to player, but not an eerily similar split shared by 10 of the 11 guys. There doesn't seem to be any real cause of/excuse for the differential (such as a low BABIP despite a high line drive rate on the road or a the opposite at home), just a large split caused by players posting large splits. The next logical step would be to see if this phenomenon is exclusive to the offense or teamwide. So, onto the pitchers!

 
16
11.1
1.69
1.59
2.79
3.79
6.75
2.38
1.13
1.59
0.294
0.348
26
18.1
1.73
4.42
2.36
2.77
9.69
13.75
2.08
5.89
0.314
0.396
14.1
18.2
2.51
3.86
4.11
4.36
3.77
3.86
2.51
2.89
0.234
0.254
32
27.1
3.09
6.59
3.2
4.63
8.44
7.24
2.53
4.61
0.253
0.316
64
57.1
3.23
5.02
3.41
3.55
7.03
8.79
2.81
3.77
0.297
0.331
58.1
60
3.55
3.75
4.35
4.29
5.71
6.75
3.24
3
0.286
0.28
52
56.1
3.81
5.59
3.34
3.79
8.31
7.35
3.29
3.83
0.327
0.309
25.1
20.1
3.91
5.31
2.7
3.28
8.17
6.2
2.49
2.21
0.279
0.299
44
36.1
4.09
6.19
1.65
2.72
12.68
11.15
0.82
3.47
0.34
0.346
60
56.2
4.35
2.38
3.51
3.62
7.95
8.26
2.85
2.7
0.273
0.242
     
     Table #2 reveals more all-around road woes mitigated by a steady dose of home cooking, but with a strange twist that at least offers a glimmer of hope that the poor showings away from home will magically disappear like so many bad dreams. Take another look at the ERA and xFIP columns: It appears that the main cause of some pitchers' road woes are not poor peripherals, but something I'll hesitantly refer to as either "bad luck", "bad timing" or "whatever the heck is making Zack Greinke give up five runs when he strikes out ten and walks one." Significantly, this disconnect is most pronounced among Greinke, Yovani Gallardo, Chris Narveson, and John Axford, or in other words, three-fifths of the starting rotation and the top reliever. Unlike the sheer inexplicable horror of the road offense, there is some hope the aforementioned pitchers start doing better away from Milwaukee. Such an improvement would be a big help down the stretch, as Randy Wolf and Shaun Marcum both seem to be pitching a bit over their heads. Of course, none of this will matter if the offense continues to stumble their way to another 3-0 loss.
     As a team who will play 31 of their 65 remaining games on the road (including series at Pittsburgh and St. Louis in the season's last 5 weeks), the Brewers are in a bad position if they continue to lay an egg on the road. (Does anyone else notice the general pessimism that has seemingly overtook me during this article? Throughout this post, I went from pointing out the Brewers' excellent home showings to expressing concern over their big home/road split to bellyaching about the club being unable to play well on the road every chance I get.) Milwaukee's run-prevention should improve while the gap between their best pitchers' process and outcomes lessens, but there is seemingly no statistical excuse present for the lack of offense. I think this is a situation where we all have to come to terms with the fact that there is no apparent explanation for the Brewers’ problems, and the only people who can do anything about it are the nine guys on the lineup card.